So Much Reform, So Little Change, part 4

The Dynamics of Organizational Change

Payne challenges the idea that it is possible to change these schools without making anyone do anything they don’t want to do. As he sees it, the fallacy of this idea is based on an assumption of a ‘rational’ organization; that is, if you show the education professionals a better way to do something, they will naturally adopt it. But this ignores the fact that once hopelessness takes root in an organization, the organization ceases to function rationally.

Observing this dynamic at work, it’s easy to label it as resistance to change, but Payne argues that this is not entirely accurate, either. It’s more skepticism than actual resistance, and it manifests itself in predictable ways. Veteran teachers – who have seen reforms come and go - are more likely to be uncooperative than newer teachers. It’s also not uncommon for relatively successful teachers to be resistant, because they’re already doing well, and they don’t need some outsider telling them what to do!

A common scenario looks like this: there’s one group of successful teachers who are split about a given reform, another group of younger teachers who are pro-reform, but who have little political clout within the system. (These are often elementary teachers who seem to have a genetic predisposition to accept change.) And then there’s a group of older, high-status teachers who are adamantly opposed. This last group often has disproportionate influence as to whether any change will be adopted, and they give legitimacy to the doubters.        

Another issue with the implementation of education research lies in the mindset of the university researchers who develop the model. Because they spend much of their time in the ivory tower, they often have little understanding of the real-world demands on teachers and principals. Worse, a deeply ingrained cultural assumption that places the university at the top of the educational food chain often leads to a sense of superiority, unjustified confidence in the reform model, and a lack of interest in practitioner knowledge! A former superintendent in New Jersey once commented that not one of the university developers he had worked with over the years had felt it necessary to strategize with school leaders before starting work.

A quality superintendent is essential to the success of any proposed reform. Unfortunately, the tenure of most urban superintendents is less than three years, which is not nearly long enough for a significant organizational change to take root, and certainly not long enough to actually begin to make a difference - which further reinforces the ‘this too shall pass’ organizational mindset. Also unfortunately, the next guy typically has no interest in building on the work of his predecessor; he’s got limited time to establish his own reputation!

This ignores research that indicates it typically takes about five years for a comprehensive school reform to produce sustainable results. What typically happens is that a new intervention shows some early promise (which gets everyone excited), and then there’s a slight dip as the initial enthusiasm wears off. Then just about the time everyone is getting on the same page and becomes comfortable with what they’re doing, there’s a change in administration, and we’re on to something else.

The other scenario (particularly when there’s serious grant money involved) is that under relatively ideal conditions, a new intervention shows promise. Under pressure from funders, the reform is then ‘brought to scale’ under less ideal conditions, with diluted support and, predictably, less impressive results - and the plug gets pulled. (Unless the funders are of an ideological bent, in which case evidence, or the lack thereof, isn’t important.)

An interesting factoid: in the year before Katrina wiped away the deeply dysfunctional New Orleans school district, said district had posted its best test scores ever.

On that note, Payne offers some interesting insight into how the ground was prepared for the Michelle Rhee reign of terror in Washington, D. C.  In addition to pervasive outright corruption, the best description of the school district prior to her administration was this outside analysis: “the district hasn’t done anything to improve student achievement.” When there’s nowhere to go but up, it engenders a willingness try anything.

This mentality of ‘anything would be an improvement’ can easily lead to investments in the simplistic and untested: closing of neighborhood schools, massive change-overs to charter schools, teacher evaluations via student test scores, etc..  Another manifestation of the ‘try anything’ mentality is the willingness to look for educational leadership anywhere except among educators! 

Unfortunately, this allows us to avoid thinking about the hard questions of instruction, human capital, and school culture - and it leaves us with a false choice between the entrenched politicized bureaucracy and ‘bold, radical’ transformation.